This paper characterizes efficient networks in player and and partner heterogeneity models for both the one-way flow and the two-way flow model. Player (partner) dependent network formation allows benefits and costs to be player (partner) heterogenous which is an important extension for modeling social networks in the real world. Employing 
Introduction
A growing literature on social and economic networks addresses the dominant effect of networks on various important outcomes such as labor markets, the spread of diseases, education, and crime. Hence, vast research not only in economics, but also in the other disciplines has been conducted to understand how the networks emerge and how they evolve over time. A substantial literature focuses on individual optimization through Nash networks, where no agent can make herself better off by deviating from her current strategy, given the strategies of the other players. A central theme in the literature on network formation is the conflict between the set of stable and efficient networks. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating efficient networks under two classes of models that allow for heterogeneity. In particular, 2 types for which Nash networks are known. I address the issue of efficiency in the form of maximizing aggregate utility of players in the network.
The seminal papers on network formation are Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) . Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provide two sided link formation, where the cost of forming links is shared by the participants and introduces pairwise stability. Bala and Goyal (2000) provide a theocratical framework to address network formation in a non-cooperative setting with homogenous players, where the cost of forming links is on one side. Bala and Goyal (2000) discuss two different types of flow. In the two way flow model, the network is undirected, so both players participating in a link access benefits from each other. However, in the one way flow model the network is directed; hence, only the initiating player can access the benefit of the link. This paper follows the Bala and Goyal (2000) framework, where link costs are borne only by the person initiating the link. Galeotti et al. (2006) relaxes the homogeneity assumption in the two way flow model, so the benefits from a link and the cost of sponsoring a link are player dependent. A more recent paper (Billand et al. 2010 ) introduces partner heterogeneity in the two way flow model, where the benefit and cost of making a link is partner heterogenous, meaning that it only depends on whom is being accessed in terms of the benefits and costs. Although Nash networks are clearly identified under heterogeneity, not much has been done about efficient networks under heterogeneity. Galeotti et al. (2006) conclude that Nash and efficient networks coincide in many situations; however, I show that this is not always true.
Specifically, a general payoff function with no restrictions allows us to illustrate situations where Nash and efficient networks do not coincide. and Billand et al (2011) extend the one way flow model by allowing benefits and costs to be player and partner heterogenous respectively. In a one way flow model, only the node who sponsors a link accesses the benefit. This fact yields a wheel type efficient architecture, that coincides with strict Nash architecture.
I start with a general payoff in a two way flow model satisfying common assumptions in the literature. Without imposing any restrictions, efficient networks can have maximal diameter and it is not possible to characterize the architecture. Once we allow for heterogeneity between players, the efficient network architectures depend on four factors: (i) the value of players, (ii) the number of minimum cost players, (iii) the difference in cost between the minimum cost player(s) and the other players and (iv) the functional form of payoffs. The first factor is controlled by a restriction which ensures that all links are profitable. I do not impose any restrictions to control the second factor, since having more than one minimum cost player does not change the results qualitatively. To deal with the third factor, I introduce the widely used linearity, strict concavity, and convexity assumptions on the payoffs. The fourth factor is accounted for with the restrictions that are already imposed, but I introduce an additional condition in the two way flow player heterogeneity model. I provide the architecture, as well as, the diameter to identify the efficient networks. The architecture provides information about how the efficient networks look, and the diameter helps to determine the maximum distance between any two players in the network. The crucial difference between player and partner heterogeneity models is in the player who sponsors links changes. Other important differences are some changes in the architecture and diameter for a couple of cases studied. Finally, for one way flow models, there is no difference between player and partner heterogeneity models and the Nash and efficient Each player i chooses a strategy g i = (g i,1 , . . . , g i,i−1 , g i,i+1 , . . . , g i,n ) where g i,j ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ N \ {i}. The interpretation of g i,j = 1 is that player i forms an arc with player j = i, and the interpretation of g i,j = 0 is that i forms no arc with player j. I assume that player i cannot form an arc with herself. I only consider pure strategies. Let G i be the set of all strategies of player i ∈ N . Network relations among players are formally represented by directed networks whose nodes are identified by the players. I assume that if g i,j = 1, then ji ∈ A(g). An arc ji is shown by an arrow from j to i. Thus, if i chooses to link with j, the arc will be directed from j to i and it also means that player i bears the cost of making the link.
For a directed network, g, a path from player k to player j, j = k, is a finite sequence j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j m of distinct players such that j 0 = j, j m = k and g j ,j +1 = 1 for = 0, . . . , m − 1. A chain exists between player k and player j, j = k by replacing g j ,j +1 = 1 by
Given a network g, I define a component, D(g), as a set of players such that there is a chain between any two players who belong to D(g), and there does not exist a chain between a player in D(g) and a player who does not belong to D(g). A network g is connected if it contains one component, and is minimally connected if it is not possible to preserve its connectivity whenever an arc is removed.
A network g is a star if there is a player i such that max{g i,j , g j,i } = 1 for all j ∈ N \ {i} and g ,j = 0 for all ∈ N \ {i} and j ∈ N \ {i, }. The network g is an inward pointing star or center sponsored star if it is a star and for the center player i, we have g j,i = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Let N ⊂ N . The network g is an outward pointing star or periphery sponsored star if it is a star and for the center player i, we have g i,j = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
A network in which each group constitutes a star and a single player i of group l forms a link with the central player j of group l ' where l = l ' , then it is referred to as an interlinked star network. If each star is center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored), the network is said to be an interlinked center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) star.
Define N i (g) = {i} ∪ {j ∈ N \ {i} | there is a chain between i and j in g} as the set of players who are observed by player i with the convention that player i always "observes" herself. I assume that player i obtains no additional resources from herself by forming arcs.
However, player i can obtain her own resources even if she forms no arcs and there is no network.
I will now define two classes of models that assumes the benefit and cost of a link can be different among players. Precisely, in the player heterogeneity model proposed by , each player i obtains V i > 0 from each player j ∈ N i (g) \ {i}, and incurs a cost c i > 0 when she forms a link with player j = i. In the partner heterogeneity model introduced by (Billand et al. 2009 ), each player i obtains V j > 0 from each player j ∈ N i (g) \ {i}, and incurs a cost c j > 0 when she forms a link with player j = i.
Another class of models considers the direction of information flow. In the two way flow model, both players sharing a link access each other; hence, the information flow is undirected. On the other hand, the one way flow model assumes that the network is directed; therefore, only the sponsor of a link can access benefits.
Let π : R 2 + → R be such that π(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y. The payoff of player i is given by:
Given the properties of the function π, the first term can be interpreted as the "benefits" that agent i receives from her links, while the second term measures the "costs" associated with forming them. Observe that this is the model proposed by Bala and Goyal (2000) .
In the player heterogeneity model, V i replaces V and c i replaces c while in the partner heterogeneity model, V j replaces V and c j replaces c in the payoff function.
Given a network g, the aggregate payoff is stated as follows:
A network is said to be efficient if W (g) ≥ W (g ) for any g = g where g represents all other possible networks.
3 Player Heterogeneity Model
General Payoff Function
Let π : R N + → R such that π(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y. Let the payoff function for player i be:
Lemma 1: Suppose the payoff function is given by (1) and π(x + 1, y + 1) ≥ π(x, y), for all x ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} and y ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1}. Then, any efficient network, g is minimally connected.
Proof : π(x + 1, y + 1) ≥ π(x, y) for all x ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} and y ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} implies that making links to every additional unobserved player provides a net payoff. Therefore, in the efficient network, there will be no singletons. To maximize the aggregate payoff, redundant links are eliminated. Hence, the efficient networks are minimally connected.
Note that Lemma 1 does not directly impose a condition on the functional form and holds for both player and partner heterogeneity models. It says that values and costs vary such that every link is profitable, which implies that efficient networks have one component. Even though this assumption leads to analyzing only connected networks, it makes it possible to identify and characterize the efficient network structure. Throughout the paper, I will generally assume that Lemma 1 holds.
Efficient networks are expected to have a very low diameter and exhibit very high centrality. However, once the values and costs are allowed to be player (partner) specific, the efficient networks can have more decentralized architectures. The next proposition indicates that when values and costs are allowed to vary freely, it is possible to have decentralized architectures and even maximal diameter.
Proposition 1: Suppose the payoff function is given by (2) and satisfies Lemma 1. There exists parameter values V i and c i such that the efficient network, g, has maximum diameter of (n − 1).
Formal proof is omitted. To illustrate an efficient network which has maximal diameter, I provide the following example which utilizes an additively separable form, where the benefits and costs can be expressed as separate terms. 1
Example 1: Suppose the payoff function of player i is given by:
Suppose there is one minimum cost player represented by L and 3 high cost players represented by H. Let c L and c H be 2 and 3 respectively. Assume that all players have the same The above example provides the intuition to determine the factors that affect the architecture of the efficient networks. Without a restriction on the payoff specification, it is 1 I consider an additively separable form which has economic interpretation and easy to construct. The below function satisfies the assumptions of being strictly increasing in value and strictly decreasing in cost. In addition, it exhibits strict concavity in values and strict convexity in cost.
2 For simplicity I introduce two types of players represented by L and H. However, it is possible to have any heterogeneity between players in values and costs. not possible to characterize the efficient networks. Therefore, I impose restrictions on the payoff function. I consider the following cases: linear, strictly concave and convex payoffs in cost.
Linear Payoffs
Suppose the payoff function of player i is given by:
where ∀i, j ∈ N . Observe that if there is a single minimum cost player, then the efficient network is a center sponsored star. If there is more than one minimal cost players, then the star architecture is still efficient. However, the center sponsored interlinked star, where the links are sponsored by the minimum cost players is also efficient. Figure 1 illustrates the possible efficient networks associated with Proposition 2.
Figure 1: Examples of Efficient Networks
A linear payoff specification is the simplest case and it is possible to identify the diameter and architecture of the efficient network without Lemma 1. 4 
Strictly Concave and Convex Payoffs in Cost
With a linear payoff function, it is possible to determine the diameter and architecture without any strong restrictions. However, the interpretation of the model is limited. Strict concavity or convexity specifications are widely used in the literature to address this limi-tation. I define strictly concave and convex payoff functions 5 in terms of the cost argument in the following way:
then the payoff function is strictly concave in the cost argument.
then the payoff function is strictly convex in the cost argument.
Proposition 3: Suppose the payoff function is given by (2), C(g) satisfies strict concavity in cost and Lemma 1. If g is an efficient network, then it is minimally connected and the unique efficient architecture is a center sponsored star.
Proof : It is clear that if g is an efficient network and i∈N V i ≥ c i then Lemma 1 implies that g is minimally connected. Since n ≥ 3, it follows that D(g) ≥ 2. Moreover, if a player i ∈ N forms a link with player k, then i ∈ argmin j∈N c j . Otherwise, it is possible to replace the link i, k by a link j, k where j ∈ argmin j∈N c j to obtain a higher total utility. From the property of strictly concave functions, π(V, (k − 1)c i ) < (k − 1)π(V, c i ). Therefore, to maximize total utility, all the links must be sponsored by a single minimum cost player.
Since all the links are sponsored by a single minimum cost player, star is the only possible efficient architecture.
Note that under the strict concavity case, the number of minimum cost players does not play a role, the unique efficient network is a center sponsored star. For the convexity case, I will impose an additional condition to characterize the efficient network.
Note that this condition is not on the functional form of the payoffs. It can easily be shown through modifying Example 1 that the diameter can be as high as (n − 1) when the 5 An important fact to mention is that all the concave (convex) functions are subadditive (superadditive); however, the reverse is not true. The subadditivity (superadditivity) property implies that the marginal cost of adding links for a minimum cost player decreases (increases) as the number of links sponsored increases. These properties enable us to track the marginal cost of sponsoring links and simplify the identification of efficient networks.
payoff function is strictly convex in cost. Condition 1 eliminates cases where the marginal cost of sponsoring a link for a high cost player is less than the marginal cost of sponsoring a link for a minimum cost player. Once Condition 1 is satisfied, all the links will be sponsored by the minimum cost player(s). Proof : It is clear that if g is an efficient network and i∈N V i ≥ c i then g is minimally connected. Since n ≥ 3, it follows that D(g) ≥ 2. Condition 1 ensures that even though C(g) is strictly convex, to maximize total utility the minimum cost player still sponsors the links. That is, if a player i ∈ N forms a link with player k, then i ∈ argmin j∈N c j , otherwise it is possible to replace the link i, k by a link j, k where j ∈ argmin j∈N c j . Condition 1 ensures that all the links will be sponsored by the minimum cost players. I obtain the interlinked star type architecture where a high cost player can stay in the center as a bridge player without sponsoring any links.
Note that if there is more than one minimum cost players in g, then a center sponsored interlinked star is the efficient architecture as opposed to the star architecture. The intuition for this case is that it becomes inefficient for a single minimum cost player to sponsor all the links since the payoff is strictly convex in cost.
The efficient networks in two way flow and player heterogeneity models generally exhibit high centrality and low diameter. Introducing the player heterogeneity increases the possibilities of efficient networks. Compared to Bala and Goyal (2000) , in addition to the star architecture, interlinked stars can also be efficient, which occurs in linear specification and strictly convex in cost cases. Assuming strict convexity requires an additional condition that ensures all links are sponsored by the minimum cost player(s).
In the partner heterogeneity model (Billand et al. 2011 ), benefits and costs vary according to whom is being accessed. With this type of heterogeneity, the set of strict Nash networks substantially increase and new architectures arise.
In this section, I analyze the efficient architectures.
Let π : R 2 + → R such that π(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y. Let the payoff function for player i be:
Remark 1 In player heterogeneity, a non-minimal cost player can serve as a bridge player as seen in Figure 1 . However, in the partner heterogeneity, efficient network does not have such architecture. Observe that to have a bridge the player in player heterogeneity model is not sponsoring any links. These links are sponsored by the minimal cost players around the bridge player. However, such a bridge player in the partner heterogeneity model requires sponsoring two links for that player, which is not efficient when payoff is strictly convex cost.
One Way Flow Models
In this section, I identify the efficient networks in the one way flow models. In the one . Both of these papers establish strict Nash networks; however, they give little information about the efficient networks. 6 The next proposition identifies the efficient network for player heterogenous one way flow model, which is an adaption from Bala and Goyal (2000).
Proposition 5: Suppose the payoff function is given by (5) and Lemma 1 is satisfied. If
.., n} then the unique efficient architecture is a wheel. If π(
.., n} then the empty network is efficient.
Proof : I will first consider the connected case. Let Γ be the set of values (B(g), C(g)). 
as well. Therefore, g w is an efficient architecture. To show uniqueness, note that the assumptions on π imply that
On the other hand, suppose C i (g) = 1 for all i ∈ N . As the wheel is the only connected network with n agents, and g = g w , there must be an agent j such that
In a wheel architecture, sponsoring a single link allows all the agents to access each other. Note that the order of players or having more than one minimum cost player does not have any effect on the efficient architecture. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper identifies the efficient networks in the player and partner heterogeneity models with various functional forms. With a two way flow of information, I find that payoff function specification, the differences in cost between minimum cost player(s) and the other players and the number of minimum cost players play a crucial role in determining the architecture of the efficient networks. I deal with the first two determinants by imposing additional restrictions if necessary. Note that having more than one minimum cost players introduces some symmetries and additional efficient network architectures. However, the efficient network architectures in the case of having more minimum cost players can still be identified without imposing any restrictions unlike the other two determinants.
There are some notable differences between the efficient architectures under the player and partner heterogeneity models. The first difference is in the player heterogeneity model minimum cost player(s) sponsor all the links. However, in partner heterogeneity a high cost player can also sponsor some links. In the homogenous model discussed by Bala and Goyal (2000) , efficient networks have star architecture. However, when we allow for heterogeneity in values and costs, a rather decentralized efficient architecture in the form of interlinked stars occurs in linear and strictly convex payoffs in cost.
In the one way flow model, the architecture of the efficient network with player and partner heterogeneity is identical. The only connected efficient architecture is a wheel for these cases, where each agent can access to all other agents by sponsoring a single link. I conclude that strict Nash networks in one way flow model discussed by Galleotti (2006) and Billand et al. (2011) are also efficient.
